



## BRIEFING NOTE FOR THE MINISTER

### CANADA'S APPROACH TO TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

#### **Strategic Objectives**

- The Government of Canada is committed to ensuring its national security framework responds to the terrorist threat, while safeguarding our values, our rights and freedoms, and the open, inclusive and democratic character of our country.

#### **Key Messages**

##### *Approach to Countering Terrorism*

- The current terrorist threat in Canada is dominated by individuals radicalized to violence that either seek to conduct terrorist activities abroad or here in Canada.
- Critical to combatting the threat of terrorism is the collaboration among Government partners including the RCMP and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
- National security criminal investigations are conducted primarily by the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSET), strategically based in locations across Canada, who work with policing and government partners to investigate threats to national security.
- The RCMP also established the National Security Joint Operations Centre (NSJOC) in 2014 to enhance the Government of Canada's (GOC) response to high-risk travelers (HRTs) who pose a threat of terrorism-related violence in Canada and abroad.
- The NSJOC is an example of interdepartmental collaboration with several key partner agencies that facilitates real-time exchange of information and supports the coordination of operational responses. Participating agencies include the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), CSIS, and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC).
- Police of Jurisdiction (POJs) are critical to the RCMP's counterterrorism efforts. As the primary police force in their communities, POJs are uniquely placed to identify local and regional threats, including individuals becoming radicalized to violence, given their strong ties and experience within the community. POJs are also the first line of defence to respond quickly to contain a threat, or respond to a terrorist incident.
- The RCMP also relies on its international law enforcement partners -- as terrorism is not solely a Canadian issue. The RCMP must learn from the best practices and experiences of its law enforcement partners to improve its efforts.

##### *Countering Radicalization to Violence (CRV)*

- Collaboration at the community-level is also critical to law enforcements' collective efforts to keep Canadians safe.
- The RCMP recognizes that the best way to mitigate the threat of terrorism is to prevent someone from being radicalized to violence in the first place.
- Radicalization to violence is not limited to a single ethnic group, religion, socio-economic class or political world-view.

Prepared under the provision of the Access to Information Act / Document préparé en vertu de la loi sur l'accès à l'information

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- Prevention is a core RCMP mandate, and the RCMP has a robust national security approach that includes prevention activities in parallel to operations
- RCMP CRV efforts form part of three key activities – outreach, training and intervention. This includes outreach awareness sessions to build community trust, and directly training law enforcement and other front line personnel.
- These efforts include supporting POJ community outreach and engagement initiatives which help build trust and relationships with the community. This trust helps to maintain open communication between law enforcement and the community.
- RCMP training efforts are focused on first responders, training front line personnel across the country to identify the early signs of radicalization to violence. The RCMP has trained more than 2500 first responders through the Counter Terrorism Information Officer (CTIO) and dedicated CRV training sessions.
- The RCMP also provides direct support, through a dedicated intervention team, to front line investigators to assess the risk of individuals at various stages of the radicalization to violence process.
- The Intervention team can also assess the potential to apply alternative approaches, outside the criminal justice system, to support those who are at risk or have been radicalized to violence. Alternative approaches could include facilitated engagement with human service professionals in the community. This allows the individual to be managed through a collective community effort, while being monitored and assessed as they receive support.

*Returnees*

- Leaving Canada to participate in the activity of terrorist group is an offence under Canadian law. It is also an offence for any Canadian citizen or permanent resident to commit an act outside of Canada that would be considered a terrorism offence if committed in Canada.
- However, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* guarantees Canadian citizens the right to return to Canada.
- Therefore, even if a Canadian engaged in terrorist activity abroad, the government of Canada must facilitate their return to Canada.
- The government of Canada manages the risk of returning high risk travelers through the High Risk Returnee Interdepartmental Taskforce and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Security Joint Operation Centre (NSJOC).
- The NSJOC allows for operational coordination and real time information sharing to ensure an effective inter-agency response.
- RCMP is also proactively working with Canada's diplomatic missions overseas to identify HRTs before they begin their journey back to Canada.
- Once RCMP is made aware of a possible returnee, they exchange what information they have through the NSJOC and existing mechanisms and make an assessment of what risk they may pose.
- Following that, the Taskforce will meet to discuss as a community, what measures can be taken to control the return of the individual. There are standard operating procedures in place for this process, including what measures can be put in place to address returnees.

- For instance, RCMP may use undercover officers to engage with the HRT to collect evidence, or to monitor them during their flight home.
- They could also be subjected to secondary customs screening and in some cases, or detention by police, when they reach Canada.
- We have seen high risk travelers that have returned to Canada. However, the approach used has been different based on the level of threat they pose, and the extent of information obtained as part of the investigation.
- RCMP has pursued a number of options upon their return, including ongoing active investigation as they collect evidence and criminal charges. RCMP has also used peace bonds in an attempt to mitigate the threat an individual may pose.
- RCMP have also used countering radicalization to violence (CRV) efforts, such as having their intervention team work with the returnee's family to open up dialogue with the individual and to help support the returnee's disengagement from their radical ideology and past behavior.
- Moving forward, we must continue to work to identify how to best address returnees. While they may have been engaged in terrorism abroad and broken the law, not all returnees continue to pose a threat – they may now be disillusioned with the cause.
- The government of Canada must focus its investigative resources on those that continue to pose a threat to Canada, and leverage efforts such as CRV to work with those who may no longer be interested in violence.

**Additional Information to Include in Background Materials (*For bilateral Meeting with the U.K.*)**

- The criminal threat in the UK is similar to any of the Western European countries and centers primarily in the larger cities (London, Birmingham, Manchester).
- The threat in the UK is clear – several high profile attacks have taken place in both London and Manchester.
- Drug trafficking, money laundering and fraud continue in London and throughout the UK.
- The RCMP are engaged with active investigations in all noted areas and are working very closely to assist our foreign partners with Canadian based investigative inquiries.
- The RCMP have two Liaison Officers based in London, an analyst embedded within the National Crime Agency and a second analyst embedded within the Joint Narcotics Analysis Centre (JNAC).
- The Primary interlocutors for the Liaison Officers are the Metropolitan Police (Counter Terrorism), the National Crime Agency, the Greater Manchester Police (North West Counter Terrorism Unit), City of London Police, UK Serious Fraud Office, Police Service of Northern Ireland and Police Scotland. Cooperation with each of the organisations is exceptional good.
- As the UK law and policing closely mirrors Canadian there are rarely any issues with cooperation.
- However, an issue has arisen due to the UK's reaction to failures in the US to respect disclosure caveats from Metropolitan Police Counter Terrorism (SO15).
- This has resulted in delays and limitations to information sharing by the UK following the recent terrorist attacks. The RCMP is working closely with SO15 to resolve this

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issue – this has had some impact as information flows have recently increased in speed and scope.

**17-002092 Input to Scenario Note- Counter Terrorism**

**South East Asia region Law Enforcement Coordination Meeting**  
**Singapore**  
**July 26-27, 2017**

**National Security Threat Environment**

- The threat environment continues to be dominated by individuals radicalized to violence who either seek to travel abroad to conduct terrorist activity, known as high risk travellers (HRTs), or those with plans to engage in such activities in Canada. While organized, directed plots, remain a concern, lone actors continue to be the primary threat.
- Those returning from conflict zones, known as returnees, may also present varying levels of risk – some may be disenfranchised with the ideology and be seeking to reintegrate with society. Others may continue to pose a threat. Still others may have spouses or children, posing additional immigration and integration challenges.
- Canadians abroad continue to be at risk of being targeted by hostage-takers due to the low-risk, high-reward nature of kidnap for ransom. Kidnap for random continues to pose a serious threat to Canada. The RCMP regards hostage taking as a serious threat to Canadians travelling abroad in the South East Asia (SEA) region.
- This threat is exemplified by the high profile hostage taking of Canadians John Ridsdel and Robert Hall in 2015 by the Abu Sayyaf group in the Philippines, and their subsequent murders in 2016.
- The RCMP and AFP should continue to monitor the threat of terrorism in SEA, which continues to grow. For example, recently this threat has resulted in serious risk advisories for a number of regions in the Philippines due to significant risks of terrorist attacks, more frequent kidnappings, and clashes between insurgent groups and security forces.

**RCMP Response:**

- As Canada's national police force, the RCMP has a legislated mandate to both prevent and investigate criminal activity related to national security.
- Since the introduction of the *Anti-terrorism Act* (ATA) in 2001, the RCMP and its partners have had significant success in using its tools to combat national security threats. To date, 24 individuals have been convicted and criminal charges have been brought against an additional 17 for various terrorism-related activities.

**Collaboration**

- The Government of Canada has adopted a whole of government approach to address the threat of terrorism, bringing together the capabilities of all relevant departments and agencies.
- For example, the RCMP have developed the National Security Joint Operations Centre (NSJOC), co-locating analysts from agencies across the security and intelligence community to enhance information sharing, and enabling the best-placed agency to respond.
- While it is a *Criminal Code* offence to engage in terrorist activity – whether the activity occurs in Canada or abroad, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* guarantees Canadian citizens the right to return to Canada, even if a citizen was suspected of being involved in terrorist activity.

- Managing the return of an individual suspected of being involved in terrorist activity also requires a whole of Government response to mitigate any threat posed. That is why processes have been put in place for all relevant departments and agencies to jointly assess the risk a returnee may pose, and to identify what steps need to be taken to manage their return.
- The government of Canada manages the risk of returning high risk travelers (HRT) through the RCMP NSJOC and the High Risk Returnee Interdepartmental Taskforce (IDTF).
- IDTF members include Global Affairs Canada, the RCMP, CBSA, CSIS, Passport Canada, Public Safety Canada and Transport Canada.
- The taskforce allows partners to collectively identify what measures can mitigate the threat these individuals may pose during their return to Canada. This could include sending officers overseas to collect evidence before they depart, or their detention by police upon arrival in Canada.

### Prevention

- Prevention is a core Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) mandate. In keeping with this mandate, we have incorporated Countering Radicalization to Violence (CRV) efforts into our counterterrorism approach. Specifically, RCMP CRV efforts are comprised of three pillars - training, outreach and intervention, which involves:
- Helping train and empower law enforcement and other first responders to identify the early signs of radicalization to violence;
- Public engagement efforts, such as working with our Government partners, including Public Safety Canada's new proposed office of public engagement and counter-radicalization, in developing a range of awareness products;
- An intervention team made up of experienced personnel to assess the risks posed by known subjects of investigation, and develop alternative approaches to managing the threat other than the criminal justice system.

### Key discussion Points:

- **The RCMP is responsible for a wide range of national security related activities, however in the current threat environment, the RCMP's primary focus is on terrorism-related activity.**
- **Our efforts are primarily focused on those that are engaged in terrorist activities abroad, returnees from foreign conflict zones, those that seek to travel for terrorist purposes and those who plan to conduct attacks in Canada.**
- **Critical to combatting these threats is the collaboration among Government partners. That is why we developed the RCMP-led National Security Joint Operation Centre to facilitate information sharing.**
- **We must make every effort to manage the threats that HRTs may pose during their journey and when they return to the country. In Canada, we work through the High Risk Returnee Interdepartmental Taskforce (IDTF) led by Global Affairs Canada (GAC), to collectively identify what the Government can do to mitigate any threat a returnee may pose.**
- **This process also helps us collectively determine how to respond once they arrive, whether it is conducting a criminal investigation, seeking a peace bond or engaging our Intervention Team (e.g., engaging families, facilitating engagement with human service professionals).**

- RCMP CRV efforts are comprised of three pillars – outreach, training and intervention. This includes outreach awareness sessions to build community trust, and directly training law enforcement and other front line personnel.
- Intervention involves alternative approaches, outside the criminal justice system, to support those who are at risk or have been radicalized to violence.

ISSUE

**COUNTERING TERRORISM AND COUNTERING RADICALIZATION TO VIOLENCE INITIATIVES**

**TALKING POINTS** (please include key messages, questions, and any responsive points)

*Approach to Countering Terrorism*

- The current terrorist threat in Canada is dominated by individuals radicalized to violence that either seek to conduct terrorist activities abroad or here in Canada.
- Critical to combatting these threats is the collaboration among Government partners including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
- National security investigations are conducted primarily by the RCMP-led Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSET), strategically based in locations across Canada, who work with policing and government partners to investigate threats to our national security.
- The RCMP also established the National Security Joint Operations Centre (NSJOC) in 2014 to enhance the Government of Canada's (GOC) response to high-risk travelers (HRTs) who pose a threat of terrorism-related violence in Canada and abroad.
- The NSJOC is an example of interdepartmental collaboration with several key partner agencies that facilitates real-time exchange of information and supports the coordination of operational responses. Participating agencies include the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), CSIS, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC), the Communications Security Establishment, and the Canadian Armed Forces.
- Since the introduction of the Anti-terrorism Act (ATA) in 2001, the RCMP and its partners have had significant success in using its tools to combat national security threats. To date, 24 individuals have been convicted and criminal charges have been brought against an additional 17 for various terrorism-related activities.
- Police of Jurisdiction (POJs) are critical to the RCMP's counterterrorism efforts. As the primary police force in their communities, POJs are uniquely placed to identify local and regional threats, including individuals becoming radicalized to violence, given their strong ties and experience within the community. POJs are also the first line of defence to respond quickly to contain a threat, or respond to a terrorist incident.
- The RCMP also relies on our international law enforcement partners – this is not solely a Canadian issue, and we must learn from each other's best practices and experiences to improve our own efforts.

*Returnees*

- It is a *Criminal Code* offence to engage in terrorist activity – whether the activity occurs in Canada or abroad. It is also a *Criminal Code* offence to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity.
- However, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* guarantees Canadian citizens the right to return to Canada, even if a citizen was suspected of being involved in terrorist activity. Canadian law does not allow Canadians to be stripped of their citizenship for terrorism offences.
- Managing the return of an individual suspected of being involved in terrorist activity requires a whole of Government response to mitigate any threat posed. That is why

processes have been put in place for all relevant departments and agencies to jointly assess the risk a returnee may pose, and to identify what steps need to be taken to manage their return.

- The government of Canada manages the risk of returning high risk travelers (HRT) through the High Risk Returnee Interdepartmental Taskforce (IDTF).
- IDTF members include Global Affairs Canada, the RCMP, CBSA, CSIS, Passport Canada, Public Safety Canada and Transport Canada.
- The taskforce allows us to collectively identify what measures can mitigate the threat these individuals may pose during their return to Canada. This could include sending officers overseas to collect evidence before they depart, or their detention by police upon arrival in Canada.
- The government focuses investigative resources on those that continue to pose a threat to Canada, and leverages efforts such as Countering Radicalization to Violence (CRV) initiatives to work with those who may no longer be interested in violence.

#### *Countering Radicalization to Violence*

- Collaboration with the community is also critical to our collective efforts to keep Canadians safe.
- We recognize that the best way to mitigate the threat of terrorism is to prevent someone from being radicalized to violence in the first place.
- Radicalization to violence is not limited to a single ethnic group, religion, socio-economic class or political world-view.
- Prevention is a core Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) mandate. In keeping with this mandate, they have incorporated Countering Radicalization to Violence (CRV) efforts into their counterterrorism approach.
- RCMP CRV efforts are comprised of three pillars – outreach, training and intervention. This includes outreach awareness sessions to build community trust, and directly training law enforcement and other front line personnel.
- These efforts include supporting POJ community outreach and engagement initiatives which help build trust and relationships with the community. This trust helps to maintain open communication between law enforcement and the community.
- RCMP training efforts are focused on first responders, training front line personnel across the country to identify the early signs of radicalization to violence. The RCMP has trained more than 2500 first responders through the Counter Terrorism Information Officer (CTIO) and dedicated CRV training sessions.
- The RCMP also plays a role in reviewing alternative approaches, outside the criminal justice system, to support those who are at risk or have been radicalized to violence. Alternative approaches could include facilitated engagement with human service professionals in the community. This allows the individual to be managed through a collective community effort, while being monitored and assessed as they receive support.

#### *Critical and Soft Target Protection*

- Around the world, attacks concentrating on “soft targets” have become increasingly popular for terrorist organizations like Daesh. These targets include public spaces such as malls, busy public venues and celebrations.
- Absent a dedicated threat or a connection to the Federal remit (e.g. VIP protection or event sponsored by the Federal government), the responsibility for protecting soft targets lies with POJs and industry. Federal agencies are continuously assessing threats to dignitaries, public events and symbolic sites.

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- The RCMP has a number of programs in place to help exchange best practices and empower our POJ and industry partners to enhance security.
- For example, the Counter Terrorism Information Officer (CTIO) training provides first responders with the ability to recognize common indicators of terrorist violence, and informs them how to report and manage such threats.
- Programs and initiatives which support the protection of Canada's national security include the RCMP's National Critical Infrastructure Team (NCIT) who examine physical and cyber threats to critical infrastructure in support of the RCMP and Government of Canada's critical infrastructure protection mandates.
- Critical Infrastructure owners and operators may report suspicious activity through the RCMP's Suspicious Incident Reporting (SIR) system, through direct contacts within RCMP and local police of jurisdiction units, or through Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS).
- For schools in RCMP jurisdictions, the RCMP also has the SAFE Plan (School Action for Emergencies) program, an effective operational planning and support tool which can be applied when responding to serious school incidents.
- Should a critical or soft target be subject to a threat, the RCMP can also provide direct advice on how to enhance security. For instance, following the attack in Ste. Foy Quebec, RCMP personnel across the country engaged with Mosques to provide security best practices.
- The RCMP is also engaged with the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) in relation to efforts they are leading for improved international preparedness focused on soft target protection.

Author.:

Consulted:

Approved:

Date:

**Q. What steps does the government take to deal with returnees?**

A. The *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* guarantees Canadian citizens the right to return to Canada. Therefore, even if a citizen was suspected of being involved in terrorist activity, they have every right to return to Canada. Managing the return of an individual suspected of being involved in terrorist activity requires a whole of Government response, the security and intelligence community works closely with all necessary domestic and international partners to repatriate returnees.

**Q. What happens when someone returns to Canada from a foreign conflict zone?**

A. It is a *Criminal Code* offence to engage in terrorist activity – whether the activity occurs in Canada or abroad. It is also a *Criminal Code* offence to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity. Therefore, the RCMP could pursue a number of options. Should the RCMP have sufficient evidence, charges could be laid upon an individual's return to Canada. Given that terrorism investigations are complex and resource intensive there may not be sufficient evidence for charges. In such cases, the RCMP could also continue their investigation or apply for peace bond to help mitigate some of the risk that an individual may pose.

The Government could also mitigate the threat though efforts outside the criminal justice system. Not all returnees continue to pose a threat – some may now be disillusioned with the cause. The government could then focus investigative resources on those that continue to pose a threat to Canada, and leverage efforts such as Countering Radicalization to Violence (CRV) initiatives to work with those who may no longer be interested in violence. The RCMP's intervention team can also be leveraged to engage with the returnee and the returnee's family to open up dialogue with the individual and to help support the returnee's disengagement from their radical ideology and past behavior.

**Q. Why are some people charged with terrorism-related offences while others are not?**

A. Terrorism investigations are complex and resource intensive, and are some of the most challenging investigations the RCMP conducts. Often, they require evidence of an individual's activity in foreign conflict zones, or rely on information provided by partners that we are not authorized to disclose in court. The RCMP also faces challenges in collecting digital evidence, including access to encrypted online communications.

The RCMP will seek to lay criminal charges when it feels that investigative efforts have developed sufficient evidence. There are a broad range of terrorism related charges in s. 83 or the *Criminal Code*, including offences related to participating, facilitating, instructing and counselling terrorist activity. Working closely with the Public Prosecution Service Canada (PPSC), the RCMP carefully considers which charges have the best chance of resulting in a successful prosecution, in order to most effectively mitigate the threat an individual may pose to Canada and to Canadians. Often, this will include charges other than those found under s.83 of the *Criminal Code* (e.g. murder or fraud) if there is a greater chance for a successful prosecution.

## Key Messages

- Leaving Canada to participate in the activity of terrorist group is an offence under Canadian law. It is also an offence for any Canadian citizen or permanent resident to commit an act outside of Canada that would be considered a terrorism offence if committed in Canada.
- However, the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* guarantees Canadian citizens the right to return to Canada.
- Therefore, even if a Canadian engaged in terrorist activity abroad, the government of Canada must facilitate their return to Canada.
- The government of Canada manages the risk of returning high risk travelers through the High Risk Returnee Interdepartmental Taskforce and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) National Security Joint Operation Centre (NSJOC).
- The NSJOC allows for operational coordination and real time information sharing to ensure an effective inter-agency response.
- RCMP is also proactively working with Canada's diplomatic missions overseas to identify HRTs before they begin their journey back to Canada.
- Once RCMP is made aware of a possible returnee, they exchange what information they have through the NSJOC and existing mechanisms and make an assessment of what risk they may pose.
- Following that, the Taskforce will meet to discuss as a community, what measures can be taken to control the return of the individual. There are standard operating procedures in place for this process, including what measures can be put in place to address returnees.
- For instance, RCMP may use undercover officers to engage with the HRT to collect evidence, or to monitor them during their flight home.
- They could also be subjected to secondary customs screening and in some cases, or detention by police, when they reach Canada.

**RCMP input on Returnees**

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- We have seen high risk travelers that have returned to Canada. However, the approach used has been different based on the level of threat they pose, and the extent of information obtained as part of the investigation.
- RCMP has pursued a number of options upon their return, including ongoing active investigation as they collect evidence and criminal charges. RCMP has also used peace bonds in an attempt to mitigate the threat an individual may pose.
- RCMP have also used countering radicalization to violence (CRV) efforts, such as having their intervention team work with the returnee's family to open up dialogue with the individual and to help support the returnee's disengagement from their radical ideology and past behavior.
- Moving forward, we must continue to work to identify how to best address returnees. While they may have been engaged in terrorism abroad and broken the law, not all returnees continue to pose a threat – they may now be disillusioned with the cause.
- The government of Canada must focus its investigative resources on those that continue to pose a threat to Canada, and leverage efforts such as CRV to work with those who may no longer be interested in violence.

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# Terrorism and the National Security Environment

## LinCT Regional Workshop

### April 6, 2017



Federal Policing Criminal Operations  
Royal Canadian Mounted Police

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# Agenda

- National Security and the RCMP Mandate
- Operational Environment
- Global Threat Environment
- Domestic Threat Environment
- Case Studies

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# Defining Terrorism

Defining terrorism:

- Systematic use of violence and intimidation to achieve political, religious or ideological goals

Common characteristics:

- Premeditated actions
- Designed to have far reaching repercussions
- Indiscriminate attacks/targets
- Broad targets, crossing social limits/norms

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# Terrorist Groups

**There are many categories of terrorist groups:**

- Nationalist (separatist and ethnocentric)
- Ideological (political)
- Single-issue or special interest
- State-sponsored and state-supported
- Religious/political

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# Terrorist Groups

**Groups also vary in their focus and reach:**

- International – Operate in multiple countries; retain a geographic focus (i.e., Hezbollah)
- Transnational – Operate internationally; not tied to a country or region (i.e., al Qaeda)
- Domestic – Operate in a country or region

*There are currently 53 Listed Terrorist Entities in Canada (as of March 2017)*

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# Common Terrorism Offences

- **Section 83.18 CCC** – Participation in the activity of a terrorist group
- **Section 83.19 CCC** – Facilitating terrorist activity
- **Section 83.21 CCC** – Instructing to carry out activity for terrorist group
- **Section 83.02 CCC** – Providing or collecting property for certain activities (terrorist financing)

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# Terrorism Peace Bonds

- Peace Bonds are Criminal Code provisions requiring that an individual agree to specific conditions to keep the peace
- **Section 810.011 CCC** – Seek conditions where there are reasonable grounds to fear a person may commit a terrorism offence
- Conditions vary widely; case-by-case basis
- Person subject to remand if conditions breached

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# NS Governance Model

The goal of the Governance Model is to:

- Ensure that relevant information is shared internally
- Assist in identifying “big picture” trends
- Facilitate briefing to senior management and the Minister of Public Safety
- Ensure oversight so that persons involved in NS criminal investigations adhere to the RCMP’s mandate, follow Ministerial Directives and policies, respect individual liberties, and share information appropriately

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# FPCO Operational Analysis

**FPCO Criminal Intelligence Analysts provide:**

- Operational support to INSETs and NSESS
- Contextual analysis to operations
- Information/advice to senior management

*...by:*

- Identifying trends and links among investigations
- Identifying changes and trends in the threat environment (domestic and international)
- Producing intelligence and briefing products

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# Operational Environment

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# Operational Environment



**Investigating terrorist activity and groups poses unique challenges:**

- Dynamic nature of the threat environment
- Level of commitment of individuals involved (i.e., they do not fear prosecution or death)
- International nature of activities and targets
- Limits to releasing and sharing information
- High media and political scrutiny


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# Evolving Threat Environment

Post-9/11



Pre-9/11






- Homegrown Extremists
- High Risk Travellers
- High Risk Returnees

Arab Spring/Syrian Conflict




Post-Caliphate



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# Primary Regions of Interest



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# Radicalization


**No identifiable profile but common indicators:**

- Believe in the Single Narrative
- A very social process for many
- Need a charismatic radicalizer
- Need to help the brothers and sisters
- Jihad looks exciting
- *Gangs are for kids. Jihad is for Men*

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
# Anwar Al-Awlaki

- Prominent American-Yemeni Imam and Islamic lecturer
- Senior recruiter and motivator, who was central in planning terrorist operations for al Qaeda
- Driving force behind Western youth radicalization
- Killed in US drone strike in September 2011
- Continues to influence many violent extremists



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
# Terrorist Propaganda



A GUN CAN STOP A HEARTBEAT  
BUT A CAMERA CAN GIVE LIFE TO A THOUSAND HEARTS

Unclassified

# Social Media

- Twitter 
- Facebook 
- Communication Apps 
- Al Hayat Media Center
- Dabiq / Inspire / al-Risalah



Unclassified

# Magazines



Unclassified

# Global Threat Environment

Unclassified

# Canadian Interests Abroad

Current threat environment worldwide affects Canadians and Canadian interests


- Canadian victims of terrorist activity abroad
- Canadian victims of hostage takings abroad
- Canadians involved in terrorist activity abroad

Unclassified

# Threat Environment Abroad

**ISIL has claimed responsibility for the latest keynote attacks in the West**

- Paris Attacks – November 13, 2015
- Brussels Bombings – March 22, 2016
- Orlando Nightclub Attack – June 15, 2016
- Germany: Various Attacks – July 2016
- Nice, France Attack – July 15, 2016
- Istanbul Nightclub Attack – January 1, 2017



Unclassified

# Canadian Hostages

- In **September 2015**, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) was responsible for the kidnapping and subsequent beheading of two Canadian citizens, Robert HALL and John RIDSDEL, in the Philippines.





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## Canadians Involved in Attacks Abroad

- On **July 1, 2016**, Islamic militants stormed the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka, Bangladesh, killing 22 hostages and injuring 30 people.
- **Tamim CHOWDHURY**, a Bangladeshi-Canadian, was the suspected mastermind.
- CHOWDHURY was killed in a police raid in Bangladesh in August 2016.

# Canadian Headliners

Unclassified



# High Risk Travellers

Unclassified

- Canadian citizens or permanent residents who are believed, on a reasonable suspicion, to have travelled, or intend to travel, to commit a terrorist offence (about 180 individuals\*)

*\*Government of Canada figures as of the end of 2015*

Unclassified

# National Security Joint Operations Centre

RCMP-led group formed in October 2014 to:

- Coordinate RCMP HRT initiative
- Facilitate information sharing
- Coordinate strategically with partners
- Deconflict with partners
- Provide cross-training and integration

# Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Unclassified

- There is nothing new about travelling to engage in a foreign conflict or join a terrorist group
  - Afghanistan (1978-1992): 5,000 to 20,000 FTFs
  - Bosnia (1992-1993): Up to 5,000 FTFs
  - Chechnya (late 1990s): Several hundred FTFs

Unclassified

# Types of Fighters

- **Missionary jihadists** who are primarily motivated by the regions human suffering
- **Martyrdom seekers** who regard the conflict as a route to paradise
- **Adventure seekers** who see great appeal in all of it
- **Long standing radicals** who realize a long term desire to get into the fight

Unclassified

## High Risk Returnees

- Individuals deemed to be HRTs who seek to, or have returned to, Canada
- HRRs can pose a significant threat to the national security of Canada
- Early knowledge of return and inter-agency cooperation are crucial

Unclassified

# HRR Interdepartmental Task Force (IDTF)

HRR IDTF is activated for coordinated response:

- Facilitating timely information sharing
- Providing strategic coordination with partners
- Facilitating the travel of returnees, while maintaining public safety
- Coordinating actions upon their return to Canada
- Gathering evidence

Unclassified

# Domestic Threat Environment

Unclassified

# Indicators of Mobilization to Terrorism

- Indicators of Mobilization to Terrorism (IMT) replaces the High Risk Individuals (HRI) Framework
- IMT is an assessment of observed behaviour
- Suspects and Persons of Interest linked to terrorism / criminal extremism
- 3 categories of mobilization:
  - Plotters
  - Facilitators
  - Travellers

Unclassified

## “Call of ISIL”

“If you can kill a disbelieving American or European — especially the spiteful and filthy French — or an Australian, or a Canadian, or any other disbeliever from the disbelievers waging war, including the citizens of the countries that joined a coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be.”

*- Abu Muhammad Al-Adnani, September 2014*

Unclassified

# Domestic Threats

## Types of terrorist plots/attacks

- **Directed:** Attack is planned or undertaken on the instructions of a terrorist group
- **Enabled:** Attack is planned or undertaken with the guidance of a terrorist group
- **Inspired:** Attack is planned or undertaken in support of a terrorist group or extremist ideology

# Call for Attacks in Canada

Unclassified

On August 16, 2016, the pro-Islamic State (IS) al-Wa'd Foundation published two posters warning of future lone-actor attacks in Canada.



Unclassified

# Domestic Threats: Challenges

- Unpredictability of threat actors and environment
- Monitoring online activity and gathering evidence online (operational security)
- Intelligence to evidence conundrum
- Sharing information among partner agencies (domestic and international)

Unclassified

## “Going Dark”

*An illustrative phrase used by law enforcement to refer to the increasing gap between our lawful authority to collect digital evidence and our actual capability to do so.*

Unclassified

# Questions?

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